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Abstract
We study the labor markets in China and the United States, the two largest economies in
the world, by examining the evolution of their cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles during the
past thirty years. We ﬁnd that, ﬁrst, the peak age in the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles,
which we refer to as the “golden age,” stayed almost constant at around 45-50 in the U.S.,
but decreased sharply from 55 to around 35 in China; second, the age-speciﬁc earnings grew
drastically in China, but stayed almost stagnant in the U.S.; third, the cross-sectional and
life-cycle age-earnings proﬁles were remarkably similar in the U.S., but differed substantially
in China. We propose and empirically implement a decomposition framework to infer from
the repeated cross-sectional earnings data the experience effect (i.e., human capital accumulation over the life cycle), the cohort effect (i.e., inter-cohort human capital growth), and the
time effect (i.e., changes in the human capital rental prices over time), under an identifying
assumption that the growth of the experience effect stops at the end of one’s working career.
The decomposition suggests that China has experienced a much larger inter-cohort productivity growth and higher increase in the rental price to human capital, but lower returns to
experience, compared to the U.S. We also use the inferred components to revisit several important and classical applications in macroeconomics and labor economics, including growth
accounting and the estimation of TFP growth, and the college wage premium and skill-biased
technical change.
Keywords: Age-Earnings Proﬁles, Human Capital, Life Cycle, Growth Accounting, College
Wage Premium, Skill-Biased Technical Change
JEL Codes: E24, E25, J24, J31, O47

1 Introduction
The rapid growth of the Chinese economy in the last 40 years is undoubtedly the most important economic event of our time. China’s GDP per capita (in 2010 constant US dollar) was
USD 381 when it started its “Reform and Opening Up” in 1978, and it increased to USD 9,688 in
2018, which represents an astonishing twenty-ﬁve-fold increase in 40 years. The GDP per capita
of the United States, the world’s leading economy, grew from USD 30,895 (also in 2010 constant
US dollars) in 1978 to USD 59,822 in 2018, a slightly less than two-fold increase in the same
time span.1 Numerous papers and books have been written about the Chinese economic growth
experience.2 In this paper, we examine the Chinese growth experience through the lens of the
labor market, focusing on the evolving cross-sectional earnings distributions. This follows the
long tradition in economics, as Smith (1776) noted in The Wealth of Nations that aggregate output
would accrue to various original sources of production, one of which being labor; thus the evolving earnings distribution in the Chinese labor market can provide a useful lens to examine the
underlying sources of economic growth. We contrast the Chinese labor market with that of the
United States, and provide a tale of the two labor markets over the last 30 years.3
Speciﬁcally, the object of our focus in this paper is the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁle.
The cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁle is one of the most empirically examined objects in labor
economics, dating back at least to Mincer (1974).4 A large and mature body of literature has
conﬁrmed the robust regularity of hump-shaped age-earnings proﬁles: earnings are low for
young workers who have just entered the labor market, then rise with age, but at some point
level off, and eventually decline after reaching the peak earnings age. In this paper, we call the
age group that achieves the highest average earnings in a cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁle the
“golden age.” For instance, the “golden age” in the United States has stayed at around 50 years
old, meaning that 50-year-old workers tend to have the highest average earnings among all age
groups in a cross-sectional labor market dataset.
In this paper, we start with a systematic comparison of the age-earnings proﬁles between the
U.S. and China, the two largest economies in the world. We document three striking differences
between the two labor markets during the last 30 years:
• The cross-sectional “golden age” stayed stable at around 45–50 years old in the U.S. but
continuously decreased from 55 to 35 years old in China.
• Age-speciﬁc (real) earnings were almost stagnant in the U.S. but grew drastically in China.
1 Statistics

for China and U.S. are from https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NYGDPPCAPKDCHN and
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NYGDPPCAPKDUSA, respectively.
2 The literature has examined the role of the reform’s institutional foundations (Xu, 2011; Qian, 2017), trade (Brandt
et al., 2017), political economy (Li and Zhou, 2005), among others, to the Chinese growth miracle. See Zhu (2012) and
Brandt and Rawski (2008) for detailed reviews.
3 This is inspired by Young (1992).
4 We do not attempt to review the large literature. See Heckman et al. (2006) for an excellent survey.

1

• The cross-sectional and life-cycle age-earnings proﬁles look remarkably similar in the U.S.
but differ substantially in China.
We then seek to uncover the causes of the above differences between the two labor markets. To
this end, we ﬁrst provide a framework to decompose the repeated cross-sectional age-earnings
data into experience, cohort, and time effects, where experience effects capture human capital
growth over the life cycle,5 cohort effects capture the inter-cohort productivity growth, i.e., the
relative human capital level of a cohort of workers at the time when they enter the labor market,
and time effects capture the human capital rental prices at a given time, which of course, may
change over time.
As is well-known (and we will show below), without further restrictions, these three factors
cannot be separately identiﬁed due to perfect collinearity. Lagakos et al. (2018) (hereafter, LMPQS) present a state-of-the-art treatment of the experience-cohort-time identiﬁcation issue. The
identifying assumption we adopt in this paper is that there is no growth in experience effect in
a worker’s late career, as implied by the standard human capital investment theory (Ben-Porath,
1967), which predicts no incentive to invest in human capital at the end of one’s working life. In
fact, this assumption is also consistent with several other prominent models of wage dynamics,
such as search theories with on-the-job search (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998) and job matching
models with learning (Jovanovic, 1979).6 This identiﬁcation idea is exploited originally by Heckman et al. (1998) (hereafter, HLT), and more recently also by, Huggett et al. (2011), Bowlus and
Robinson (2012), and Lagakos et al. (2018). We show that under this identifying assumption, we
can use repeated cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles to separately identify experience, cohort,
and time effects, which in turn allows us to simultaneously account for the three stylized facts
regarding the differences in the evolution of the U.S. and China’s labor markets in the last thirty
years.
First, the “golden age” in a cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁle is essentially determined by
the race between the life-cycle human capital growth (the experience effect) and the inter-cohort
productivity growth (the cohort effect). When the experience effect dominates, the “golden age”
tends to be older; when the inter-cohort productivity growth prevails, the “golden age” tends to
be younger. It is instructive to think of two extreme cases. Suppose in one extreme that there is
no inter-cohort productivity growth. Then the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁle simply reﬂects
returns to experience and achieves its highest value at the oldest age. Suppose in the other
extreme that there is no returns to experience. Then the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁle
simply reﬂects differences in cohort-speciﬁc productivity and achieves it highest value at the
youngest age, or the most recent cohort. We ﬁnd that in China, inter-cohort productivity growth
was very rapid in the last thirty years, thus it wins the race against the experience effect. As
5 We

focus on male workers in this paper, thus we use the pronoun “his.”
and Weiss (2006) provides an excellent review on these three classes of models of investment, search,
and learning that explain life-cycle wage growth.
6 Rubinstein
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a result, the golden age has experienced a gradual decline over the years. In contrast, in the
U.S., the inter-cohort productivity growth is minuscule, if any, compared to a high return to
experience, resulting in rather old golden ages.
Second, we ﬁnd that the rental price of human capital (the time effect) increased much faster
over the last thirty years in China than in the U.S. Moreover, China experienced much higher
inter-cohort human capital growth (the cohort effect) than the U.S. Both contribute to the much
faster growth in age-speciﬁc earnings in China.
Lastly, we ﬁnd that both cohort and time effects are negligible in the U.S. compared to the
experience effects.Thus, the experience effect is the main driving force of both the cross-sectional
and the life-cycle age-earnings proﬁles in the U.S. As a result, both cross-sectional and lifecycle proﬁles are close to the experience effects in such a stationary environment; hence the two
proﬁles look similar. In China, however, both cohort and time effects are substantial in the last
thirty years. Thus, stationarity is lost, and the life-cycle earnings proﬁles are drastically different
from the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles.
We also use our decomposition to revisit some important accounting exercises in macroeconomics and labor economics. First, by isolating human capital price changes obtained from time
effects, our decomposition delivers a notion of effective human capital quantities, which comprises
both the experience and the cohort effects. The decomposition allows us to conduct a growth accounting that properly accounts for the evolution of the efﬁciency units of human capital, instead
of simply the number of employed workers. Adjusting for changes in effective human capital, we
obtain a series of total factor productivity (TFP) growth estimates that are lower than previous
estimates.7 Second, we also implement the same decomposition separately for high school- and
college-educated workers. We use the education-speciﬁc decompositions to obtain an estimated
series for skill-biased technical change where relative human capital quantities between high
school- and college-skills are allowed to change over time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the facts on ageearnings proﬁles in the U.S. and China; in Section 3, we present the theoretical framework and
discuss identiﬁcation issues; in Section 4, we describe the main results from the decomposition
and the applications; in Section 5, we apply the decomposition results to revisit several classical
and important questions in macroeconomics and labor economics: Section 5.1 revisits the growth
accounting exercise by adjusting for human capital changes based on our decomposition; Section
5.2 extends the benchmark framework to present results separately by education groups, and
revisits the skill-biased technical changes by accounting for potentially differential human capital
changes of different skill groups; Section 5.3 simulates the implications on the dynamics of the
golden ages in a counterfactual economy that starts to slow down after a fast-growing period.
Finally, in Section 6, we conclude and discuss potential directions for future research.
7 This

idea has also been exploited by Bowlus and Robinson (2012).
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2 Facts
2.1

Cross-Sectional Age-Earnings Proﬁles and “Golden Ages”
We use the 1986-2012 waves of March Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and

Economic (ASEC) Supplement extracted from IPUMS (Flood et al., 2018) as the primary dataset
for the United States. CPS is the ofﬁcial source to produce many labor market statistics. The
sample period is chosen to facilitate the comparison with China, for which we only have access
to data from 1986 to 2012.8
Figure 1a depicts the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles for male workers in the U.S. Each
curve represents a cross section that pools ﬁve or four adjacent years. In the construction of
each curve, we ﬁrst perform a nonparametric kernel regression of annual labor earnings on age
separately for each cross section, where the Epanechnikov kernel function and rule-of-thumb
bandwidth estimator are applied, and then display the smoothed values with the 95% conﬁdence
intervals. To avoid potential impacts of extreme values, we drop outliers deﬁned as earnings in
the top 2.5% and bottom 2.5% in each year. We normalize all earnings to the 2015 year using
CPI. Individuals are weighted by the person-level ASEC weight. Figure 1a reveals that, ﬁrst, the
“golden age” in the U.S. is relatively stable at around 50 years old during the past three decades;
second, the U.S. has witnessed little growth in age-speciﬁc mean real earnings. That is, both the
shape and the level of the age-earnings proﬁles are largely unchanged.
To study China’s labor market, we use the Urban Household Survey (UHS) administered
by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).UHS is the only nationally representative microdata
covering consecutive years since the late 1980s. Although UHS is representative only for urban
China, it is the most comparable survey for China to CPS.
In Figure 1b, we plot the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁle for Chinese male workers, using
the same procedure as discussed before. There are several striking contrasts between Figure 1a
and Figure 1b. First, Chinese workers have experienced a dramatic increase in real earnings in
the past 30 years for all age groups. It is reﬂected in the large vertical upward shifts of the ageearnings proﬁles for later cross sections. The earnings of Chinese urban male workers increased
nearly six-fold. This is in marked contrast to the earnings stagnation in the U.S. Second, while
the shape of the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles and hence the corresponding “golden ages”
have stayed more or less constant in the U.S., the “golden age” in China has continuously evolved
to younger ages. Prior to 2000, the age-earnings proﬁles of China had a familiar hump-shape
with the “golden age” at around 55, although there already were some signs of a declining
“golden age” in 1996-2000. Between 2001 and 2004, the age-earnings proﬁle is almost ﬂat and
humps at around age 40–45. After 2005, the “golden age” is 35 years old.9
8 Throughout

this paper, a year refers to the year to which the income variable corresponds.
and Yang (2010) notice a dramatic ﬂattening of age-earnings proﬁle during the fast-growing period of
China. Cai et al. (2014) plot the income proﬁles in 2002 and 2007 using data from the Chinese Household Income
Project (CHIP), and also notice an earlier arrival of peak income age.
9 Song
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Figure 1: Evolution of Cross-Sectional Age-Earnings Proﬁles
(a) U.S.
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Notes: The top panel plots the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles of U.S. male workers, using March CPS
from 1986 to 2012. The bottom panel plots the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles of Chinese Urban male
workers, using UHS from 1986 to 2012. Each curve represents a cross section that pools adjacent years.
The solid lines are kernel smoothed values and the gray shaded areas are the 95% conﬁdence intervals.
Note that the vertical scale of the left and right subgraphs in the bottom panel differs.
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Figure 2: Evolution of Cross-Sectional “Golden Age” in the U.S. and China
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the evolution of the cross-sectional “golden age” in the U.S. and China. The blue
cross marker denotes the point estimate of the golden age in the U.S. and the red circle marker denotes
the point estimate of the golden age in China. The blue short-dashed line and the red dash-dotted lines
are the respective linear time trend in the evolution of the golden age in each country.

To sum up, Figure 2 plots the evolution of the cross-sectional “golden ages” in the U.S. and
China from 1986 through 2012. For each country and each year, we run a kernel regression of log
earnings on age to predict age-speciﬁc earnings, and obtain an estimated golden age in that year
as the age achieving the maximal predicted earnings. Furthermore, we ﬁt a linear time trend of
the estimated golden age for each country. Figure 2 shows clearly that in the U.S., the golden age
has remained constant at around 48 years old over the past 30 years, while in China there is a
strong downward trend in the golden ages during the same time period, decreasing from more
than 55 years old to around 35 years old.
Robustness of the Empirical Facts.

The above facts are robust to a series of alternative sample

restrictions and estimation methods. First, as previously mentioned, by its design, UHS only
covers urban households.10 The stark difference in the evolution of cross-sectional age-earnings
proﬁles between the U.S. and China, however, is not merely a result of the sample restriction
on urban workers in UHS. In Figure A.1, we restrict our attention to CPS households that live
in metropolitan areas, which is the closest geographic sample choice to urban households in
10 Prior

to 2002, UHS only covers households with local urban hukou. Although UHS started to include households
without local urban hukou since 2002, the coverage is so low that non-local-hukou residents are under represented. See,
for example, the discussion in Ge and Yang (2014).
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UHS. There is virtually no difference in the shape of age-earnings proﬁles, although the level of
earnings is on average higher for workers in metropolitan areas than those not in metropolitan
areas, as one may expect.
Second, due to our limited access to the UHS microdata, we do not have all provinces covered
consecutively in our sample. Because the main goal of this study is to investigate how the labor
market evolves over time, it is crucial to provide a comprehensive set of evidence that spans a
long period of time. So we choose not to drop any time periods in our main analysis. Instead,
we verify that our analysis is not affected by the regional coverage. We have a random subset
of the UHS sample households with a representative coverage of provinces (see Table B.1). The
only provinces that are included continuously throughout all the 27 years from 1986 to 2012 are
Liaoning, Shanghai, Guangdong, Sichuan. Although there are only four such provinces, they
constitute an arguably representative picture of the nation with a dispersed geographic coverage:
the Northeast (Liaoning), East (Shanghai), South Central (Guangdong), Southwest (Sichuan),
respectively. To mitigate the concern for representativeness, we replicate Figure 1b for a much
larger set of 15 provinces covering all 6 regions in Figure A.2.11 The tradeoff is that, UHS micro
data with the whole set of these 15 provinces is only available for the years from 1986 to 2009.
The pattern barely changes. Prior to 2000, the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles have a familiar
hump shape with a “golden age” of 50-55. During the early 2000s, the proﬁles are ﬂat after age
40. In 2007-2009, it already exhibits a very young “golden age” of 35-40 years old.
Finally, one natural question is whether the aforementioned pattern is a result of wages or
hours worked. Though UHS does not collect information on hours worked for most years, we can
address this question for a sub-period from 2002 to 2006 when UHS does collect information on
“total number of hours worked last month.” A typical month contains about 30/7 ≈ 4.3 weeks,
so we use this number to convert the monthly measure of hours worked to a weekly measure in
order to facilitate comparison with CPS.12 Figure A.3 shows that the age-hours proﬁles are almost
on top of each other for these two labor markets after 25, although there is a disagreement for
earlier ages between 18-25. This suggests that the patterns we document above are more likely
to be about wages, rather than hours, at least for prime-age workers older than 25.

2.2

Cross-Sectional vs. Life-Cycle Age-Earnings Proﬁles
Conceptually, a cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁle, which summarizes earnings of workers of

different ages at a given point of time, is a different notion to the life-cycle earnings proﬁle, which
tracks the earnings of a typical person over his life course. Thus one should not expect the crosssectional age-earnings proﬁles to coincide with the life-cycle ones. In Figure 3, we reproduce the
11 The 15 provinces are Beijing,

Shanxi, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan,
Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu. They altogether span all 6 regions in China—North, Northeast, East,
South Central, Southwest, and Northwest.
12 The corresponding variable in CPS is “total number of hours usually worked per week over all jobs the year prior
to the survey.”
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cross-sectional proﬁles from Figure 1 on the left, and plot the life-cycle earnings path of various
birth cohorts on the right, with each curve representing a 10-year cohort bin. The top panel is for
the U.S., and the bottom panel for China.
In the U.S. (Figure 3a), cohorts with year of birth spanning half a century share remarkably
similar life-cycle earnings paths. Furthermore, life-cycle proﬁles on the right of Figure 3a closely
resemble the cross-sectional proﬁles on the left (which is reproduced from the right panel of
Figure 1a), in both its shape and level. In a stationary environment where the life-cycle proﬁle
does not vary across cohorts, the cross-sectional proﬁles and the life-cycle proﬁles essentially
coincide with each other. In such an economy, a 30-year-old worker who wants to predict his
(real) earnings 10 years later can simply take a look at the contemporary earnings of a 40-yearold worker. This provides a justiﬁcation for the voluminous prior literature that uses crosssectional proﬁles as approximations of life-cycle patterns. Although conceptually it is not correct
to interpret cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles as life-cycle patterns, in practice they are close
to each other for the U.S. case. In other words, stationarity is an reasonable assumption when
studying the U.S. earnings proﬁles.
However, as shown in Figure 3b, the life-cycle patterns of different cohorts differ drastically
for China. More recent cohorts enjoy both much higher earnings and steeper life-cycle earnings
growth. These life-cycle proﬁles demonstrate no resemblance at all to the cross-sectional proﬁles,
although they are actually linked to each other. Note that both the left and the right panels are
simply different ways to visualize the same underlying data.13 It is perhaps not surprising that
in a fast-growing economy such as China, stationarity is not a valid approximation.
The next section provides a framework to organize the facts documented in this section.

3 A Decomposition Framework
3.1

Setup
We consider a competitive market interpretation of the observed wages, that is, the observed

level of a worker’s wage is the product of the price of human capital and the quantity of human
capital this worker supplies. Denote Wi,t as the wage of worker i at time t, Hi,t the human capital
owned by worker i at time t, and Pt the rental price of human capital at time t. We have
Wi,t = Pt · Hi,t .

(1)

Note that the rental price of human capital is allowed to vary over time but restricted to be the
same across individuals. This formulation assumes that the only heterogeneity among workers
13 Suppose

we keep track of a given time period, say, 2010, across different life-cycle proﬁles. That is, we connect
the point of age 30 in the life-cycle proﬁle for cohort 1980, age 40 for cohort 1970, age 50 for cohort 1960 and so on,
then we are able to reproduce the cross-sectional proﬁle for 2010, as (conceptually) illustrated by the dashed gray line,
which is reproduced from the 2009-2012 cross-sectional proﬁle.
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Figure 3: Cross-Sectional vs. Life-Cycle Age-Earnings Proﬁles
(a) U.S.
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(b) China
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Notes: The top panel compares the cross-sectional and life-cycle age-earnings proﬁles for U.S. male workers, and the bottom panel for urban Chinese male workers. The left subgraph of each panel is the crosssectional proﬁles reproduced from Figure 1a and 1b. The right subgraph of each panel shows the life-cycle
age-earnings proﬁles, where each curve represents a 10-year cohort bin.
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is in the quantity of human capital they possess, but not in the type of human capital. Put it
differently, we are imposing a scalar representation of human capital.14 Taking logs on both
sides of equation (1), we have:
wi,t = pt + hi,t ,

(2)

where for notational convenience, we use the lower case letters to represent the log values and
the upper case letters to represent the levels.
A cohort of workers is indexed by the year when they enter the labor market. Consider a
“representative” worker i of cohort c(i ) = c at time t. Deﬁne the human capital supplied by the
“representative” worker of cohort c at time t as the average human capital among all workers of
cohort c at time t,
hc,t := Ei [hi,t |c (i ) = c, t] .
By construction, the idiosyncratic component ϵi,t := hi,t − hc(i),t has a conditional mean of zero
(conditional on cohort c and time t). Therefore, we can rewrite equation (2) as
wi,t = pt + hc(i),t + ϵi,t ,
with Ei [ϵi,t |c (i ) = c, t] = 0, for all c and t, where the expectation is taken over individual workers
i, for a given pair of c and t.
Since neither price nor quantity of human capital is observed, this speciﬁcation leads to a
non-identiﬁcation problem. It is worth pointing out that a normalization alone does not solve the
problem, because { pt , hc,t } are not only observationally equivalent to { pt + λ, hc,t − λ} for any
constant λ (“normalization”), but also observationally equivalent to { pt + λt , hc,t − λt } for any
arbitrary series of {λt } (“non-identiﬁcation”). Consequently, without imposing further restrictions, we cannot tell how much of a wage change is due to human capital price changes and how
much is due to human capital quantity changes.
We further decompose human capital into two components hc,t = sc + rtc−c , where sc := hc,c
is the level of human capital of cohort c when they enter the labor market at year c, and rkc :=
hc,c+k − sc is the return to k years of experience for cohort c. This notation is without loss of
generality. Obviously, r0c = hc,c − sc = 0 by deﬁnition.15 Using this notation, we can decompose
14 This assumption rules out potential complementarity between different types of skills. We relax this assumption
in Section 5.2.3.
15 We do not model the labor market entry decision and abstract from the difference between age and experience.
In other words, workers of the same cohort are assumed to enter the labor market at the same age; thus, we use age
and experience interchangeably. In Section 5.2, we allow for difference between age and experience by introducing
different levels of education. But we still assume that workers with the same level education enter the labor market
at the same age. That is, conditional on education, we abstract away from any other potential difference between age
and experience. In a robustness exercise in Table 1, we consider an alternative deﬁnition of experience as years since
the ﬁrst job, where workers of the same cohort are allowed to have different levels of experience even at the same age.
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(log) wages into time effects, cohort effects, and experience effects,
wi,t = pt + sc + rkc + ϵi,t ,

(3)

with Ei [ϵi,t |c(i ) = c, t] = 0, where (i) time effects pt reﬂect the human capital prices, (ii) cohort
effects sc represent the cohort-speciﬁc human capital upon entry, and (iii) experience effects rkc
are associated with the life-cycle human capital accumulation. Note that with k = t − c, we have
perfect collinearity among year, cohort, and experience, which leads to non-identiﬁcation.
It is common in the literature to further impose the returns to experience to be the same
across cohorts, i.e., to restrict rkc ≡ rk , ∀c, which gives rise to a variant of equation (3):
wi,t = pt + sc + rk + ϵi,t .
The main beneﬁt of restricting



rkc

(3′ )

not to vary across cohorts is that we can get a complete

estimated experience proﬁle even if every cohort is observed for only part of their life cycle in the
data. It is worth noting that this restriction does not by itself solve the non-identiﬁcation problem
mentioned above. Even under this restriction, we still cannot isolate year effects, cohort effects,
and experience effects without imposing additional assumptions, due to the perfect collinearity
among year, cohort, and experience that k = t − c. We follow this common practice mainly due
to data constraint.

3.2

Cross-Sectional Age-Earnings Proﬁles and “Golden Ages”
Suppose one has constructed cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles as we have done in Figure

1a and 1b. Each cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁle for time t could be denoted {w (k; t)}kR=0 ,
where k goes from 0 (entry) to R (retirement).16 The average (log) earnings of workers with
experience k at time t is
w (k; t) := Ei [wi,t |c (i ) = t − k, t] .
where the expectation is taken over individuals i for given time t and experience k (and hence
cohort is given by c = t − k). Due to the conditional mean zero property illustrated in the
previous section, we could represent the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles as
w (k; t) = p (t) + s (t − k ) + r (k ) ,
where we move the subscripts to inside the brackets to emphasize that human capital price p is
a function of time t, cohort-speciﬁc human capital s is a function of cohort c = t − k, and the
return to experience r is a function of experience k.
Assuming differentiability, the slope of the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles at time t is
16 We

abstract from endogenous retirement decisions; hence the retirement age is set exogenously in this paper.
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given by

∂
w (k; t) = ṙ (k) − ṡ (t − k ) ,
∂k

(4)

which is positive if ṙ (k ) > ṡ (t − k ) and negative if ṙ (k ) < ṡ (t − k ).17 Note that both r and s
are in logs, so the interpretations of ṙ and ṡ are the rate of life-cycle human capital growth and
the rate of inter-cohort human capital growth, respectively. This observation immediately gives
a characterization of the shape of a cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁle:
Proposition 1. The cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁle {w (k; t)}kR=0 is increasing (decreasing, respectively) in k when the rate of life-cycle human capital growth exceeds (falls below, respectively) the rate of
inter-cohort human capital growth.
Though straightforward, Proposition 1 helps clarify the underlying forces determining the
shape of cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles. It states that the slope of a cross-sectional ageearnings proﬁle is a result of the race between life-cycle human capital growth (experience effects)
and inter-cohort human capital growth (cohort effects). If inter-cohort human capital growth is
fast, then the older cohorts tend to earn less relative to more recent cohorts; hence the crosssectional age-earnings proﬁles tend to be ﬂat or even downward sloping. If life-cycle human
capital growth dominates, then the older cohorts tend to have higher relative earnings, and then
the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles tend to be steeply upward sloping. To further illustrate
this proposition, it is instructive to consider two extreme cases. Consider a hypothetical economy where there is no inter-cohort human capital growth and each cohort is equally productive
conditional on age. In this case, the oldest group will earn the highest wages as long as returns
to experience are positive. Consider another hypothetical economy where there is no returns to
experience but more recent cohorts are getting more productive. In this case, it is the youngest
group that earns the most.
The cross-sectional “golden age” at time t can be deﬁned as:
k∗ (t) := arg max w (k; t) .
k∈[0,R]

(5)

A characterization for the “golden age” follows immediately:
Corollary 1. Suppose the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁle {w (k; t)}kR=0 is unimodal in k. The “golden
age” at time t, deﬁned by (5), happens at experience k∗ , such that
ṡ (t − k∗ ) = ṙ (k∗ ) .
In other words, the cross-sectional “golden age” happens at the point where the speed of
inter-cohort human capital growth exactly cancels out the rate of life-cycle human capital growth.
17 We present the result in continuous time for notational simplicity. The logic easily carries to a discrete time
formulation, mutatis mutandis.
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3.3

Cross-Sectional vs. Life-Cycle Age-Earnings Proﬁles
Our simple framework can also help clarify the difference between the cross-sectional and the

life-cycle proﬁles. Suppose one has constructed life-cycle age-earnings proﬁles as we have done
in Figure 3. Denote the life-cycle age-earnings proﬁle for cohort c by {w̃ (k; c)}kR=0 . The average
(log) earnings of workers in cohort c with experience k is
w̃ (k; c) := Ei [wi,t |c (i ) = c, t = c + k ] ,
where the expectation is taken over individuals i for given cohort c and experience k (and hence
time is given by t = c + k). Due to the conditional mean zero property Ei [ϵi,t |i ∈ c, t] = 0, ∀c, t,
we could represent the life-cycle age-earnings proﬁles as
w̃ (k; c) = p (c + k ) + s (c) + r (k ) .
The slope of the life-cycle age-earnings proﬁles for cohort c is given by
∂
w̃ (k; c) = ṙ (k ) + ṗ (c + k ) .
∂k

(6)

Comparing equation (4) with equation (6) makes it clear how the cross-sectional proﬁles differ
from life-cycle ones. For example, if both inter-cohort human capital growth and human capital
price increase are fast (i.e., both ṡ and ṗ are large) as is the case in China, then equations (4)
and (6) tell us that the cross-sectional proﬁles tend to be ﬂat and the life-cycle proﬁles tend to
be steep. If both inter-cohort human capital growth and human capital price changes are slow
(i.e., both ṡ and ṗ are small) as is the case in the U.S., then we would expect the cross-sectional
proﬁles to be close to life-cycle proﬁles; in fact, they should both approximate the path of returns
to experience. Given the facts we have documented in Section 2, such a tale serves as a promising
description of what happened in the two labor markets in the past three decades.
This section has discussed conceptually how the returns to experience ṙ, inter-cohort human
capital growth ṡ, and human capital price changes ṗ affect the cross-sectional and life-cycle
proﬁles, and provides a narrative of how they explain the striking differences we document for
the labor markets in the U.S. and China in the last thirty years. The next section will provide
empirical estimates for these three components. Before that, we discuss the identiﬁcation of these
three components.

3.4

Identiﬁcation
Suppose one has access to a repeated cross-sectional dataset on earnings

{wi,t } ,

t = 1, 2, . . . , T,
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where i refers to an individual observation, and t, time. At each cross section t, the individual
observations span a range of experience k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , R}. Note that repeated cross-sections differ
from panel data in that the pool of individuals can vary in different periods. For convenience,
we reproduce equation (3′ ) here:
wi,t = pt + sc + rk + ϵi,t .

(3′ )

where pt , sc , rk are vectors of time dummies, cohort dummies, and experience dummies with
k = t − c. The residual satisﬁes conditional mean zero condition Ei [ϵi,t |i ∈ c, t] = 0, ∀c, t.
Two issues are worthy of comments. First, normalization (or non-identiﬁcation of levels). For
each indicator vector, we have to omit one category as the baseline group. All estimates for the
indicator vectors are relative terms to the baseline group. For example, in the main analysis, we
set the baseline group to be “cohort 1935-39, year 1986, and experience 0-4.” The log earning
of the baseline group will be loaded onto the constant term. Second, non-identiﬁcation (of ﬁrst
differences). By deﬁnition, k = t − c holds. Due to the perfect collinearity among them, cohort,
experience, and time effects cannot be separately identiﬁed without further restrictions.18
The identifying restriction is that the growth of the experience effect is zero in the last few years
of one’s working life. This follows the approach in LMPQS, which in turn builds on the insights
of HLT.19 As HLT argued, this identifying restriction is theoretically justiﬁed by the theoretical
models of human capital investment along the lines of Ben-Porath (1967), where the incentive
for human capital investment in a life-cycle problem is small or close to zero towards the end of
career.20
We now intuitively and constructively explain how this restriction leads to the identiﬁcation
of human capital prices (time effects), cohort-speciﬁc human capital (cohort effects), and human capital accumulation paths (experience effects). Following the identifying restriction, let us
suppose that there is no human capital accumulation (say) from R − 1 to R years old.21 First,
comparing the wages of ( R − 1)-year-old workers in year t − 1 and R-year-old workers in t identiﬁes the time effect from t − 1 to t because (1) we are comparing the same cohort so the cohort
effect does not contribute to the wage differences; and (2) by the identiﬁcation assumption that
there is no growth in the experience effect, the experience effect does not contribute to the wage
18 In practice, there might be cases where they are not perfectly collinear. For instance, some surveys provide
information on the whole employment history. Then one would be able to construct the actual years of experience
by subtracting the non-employment periods, instead of the potential years of experience that are typically imputed.
Therefore, variation in the employment history can break the perfect collinearity such that individuals with the same
labor market entry year may end up with different levels of experience at a given point of time. In this case, however,
cohort, experience, and time are still typically highly interrelated. We are facing an issue of near multicollinearity and
the standard OLS estimator will generate imprecise estimates. Furthermore, the actual experience is an endogenous
labor market outcome so that controlling for the actual experience may instead contaminate the estimates (see pp.
64-68 in Angrist and Pischke, 2009, for discussion).
19 In Appendix C.1, we review in detail the literature related to the age-cohort-time identiﬁcation issue.
20 The same identiﬁcation restriction was also adopted by Bowlus and Robinson (2012) and Huggett et al. (2011).
21 The actual identifying assumption and algorithm is more sophisticated, but we provide the intuition in a nutshell
here for transparency. See Appendix C.2 for a detailed description of the iterative procedure in implementation.
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differences either.
Second, comparing the wages of ( a − 1)-year-old workers in t − 1 and a-year-old workers in t
provides information for the experience effect from a − 1 to a because (1) we are again comparing
the same cohort so the cohort effect does not contribute to the wage differences, and (2) we have
already backed out the year effect from t − 1 to t from the previous step.
Third, further comparing the wages of ( a − 1)-year-old workers and a-year-old workers in t
gives the cohort effect from cohort c = t − a to cohort c + 1 because (1) they are in the same year
so there is no time effect, and (2) we have already backed out the experience effect from a − 1 to
a.
In general, the HLT identiﬁcation approach requires the researcher to pick her preferable values for a “ﬂat region” of experience, for which there is no growth in the experience effect. It could
also be extended to allow for a pre-speciﬁed human capital depreciation rate. We acknowledge
that either input is somewhat arbitrary and cannot be inferred internally from data (which is
rooted in the non-identiﬁcation problem discussed previously). In particular, HLT assume a zero
human capital depreciation rate, consistent with estimates reported by Browning et al. (1999). We
follow this assumption, as many other papers studying life-cycle human capital accumulation
also do (e.g., Kuruscu, 2006). The exact choice for the ﬂat experience effect region is somewhat ad
hoc. We follow LMPQS by considering 40 years of experience and assuming there are no growth
in the experience effects in the last ten years in the baseline speciﬁcation. Bowlus and Robinson
(2012) attempt to determine the ﬂat experience effect age regions more carefully and prefer the
ﬂat age ranges to be 50-59 for college graduates and 46-55 for high school graduates. Our choice
of the ﬂat region largely overlaps with theirs. We have also investigated alternative speciﬁcations
discussed below to rule out various concerns.

4 Decomposition
Figure 4 shows the results from the decomposition of earnings into experience, cohort, and
time effects. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the experience effects (relative to the ﬁrst 0-4 years since
labor market entry) in 5-year bins, cohort effects (relative to the 1935-1939 birth cohorts) in 5-year
bins, and year effects (relative to 1986) year by year.
We will discuss each component in detail, but the main messages emerge clearly from Figure
4. (1) The human capital of the Chinese workers increased by 150% over the life course of 40
years of working experience, while that of the U.S. workers increased by 270%, nearly twice as
high as that of the Chinese workers. (2) In China, inter-cohort productivity growth was almost
90% in the last ﬁfty years, most of which happened since the 1960 cohort; in contrast, in the
U.S. there was only a 20% increase in the cohort-speciﬁc productivity over 50 years of cohorts
in the U.S., most of which happened between cohort 1935 and 1950. (3) The time effect, i.e., the
human capital price effect, grows more than three-fold in China from 1986 to 2012; in contrast,
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the growth of the human capital price was negligible in the U.S. (if anything, it declines at a rate
of about 1% per year).
Robustness of the Decomposition Results.

Before turning to the detailed discussion on the

interpretations and the implications of the decomposition, we emphasize that our decomposition
result is robust to alternative speciﬁcations as listed in Table 1. First, the pattern is by no means
driven by regional differences of a particular set of locations. To show that, we control for state
ﬁxed effect for the U.S. and province ﬁxed effect for China in Row 2. In Row 3, we restrict
attention to the only four provinces that are covered in the UHS sample throughout all years
including 2010-2012.
Second, we consider alternative deﬁnitions for potential experience. In the baseline, potential
experience is imputed as min {age − edu − 6, age − 18}. That is, workers with more than 12
years of schooling are assumed to start schooling at 6 years old and enter the labor market after
they ﬁnish schooling, and workers with fewer than 12 years of schooling are assumed to enter
the labor market at 18 years old. We consider an alternative and simpler deﬁnition for potential
experience as (age − 20) in Row 4. Since UHS provides information on the actual labor market
entry year, i.e., when the respondent started the ﬁrst job, we also consider experience measured
as (current calendar year − year of ﬁrst job) for China in Row 5.
Third, we examine whether our results are robust to alternative restrictions imposed by the
HLT method. In Row 6, we consider an alternative ﬂat region for experience effect and assume
that there is no growth in the experience effect in the last ﬁve years. In Row 7, we assume there
is a human capital depreciation rate of 1% per year in the last ﬁve years. In Row 8, we drop older
samples and restrict attention to up to 35 years of experience, and assume a ﬂat region in the
last ﬁve years within that range. Although the magnitude of experience effects varies somewhat
across speciﬁcations as recognized by LMPQS, the general patterns of interest are not affected
by the choice of speciﬁcations, especially in terms of the comparison between the U.S. and the
Chinese labor markets.
Fourth, we consider in Row 9 the effects when we focus on the median earnings instead of the
mean earnings. Medians are less sensitive than means to outliers and are less likely to be affected
by the evolving inequality in the top or the bottom of the earnings distribution. Furthermore,
average annual earnings, which we are forced to look at due to data limitation, is a combination
of wages and hours. Medians also help in the sense that the hours worked by the median men
within each group are much more likely to be similar.22 Hence in Row 9, we perform a quantile
regression analysis to estimate the conditional median earnings effects of experience, cohort, and
time.
22 Casanova (2013) documents a phenomenon of partial retirement, i.e., as workers age, an increasing fraction is
transitioning from full-time into part-time work. Without proper information on hours worked or part-time employment status in the UHS, we cannot directly address the partial retirement issue. However, using median regression
techniques minimizes the potential bias to the extent that a median worker is working full time.
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Figure 4: Decomposition
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the decomposition results of experience, cohort, and time effects in the U.S. (blue diamond) and China (red
circle) under the baseline speciﬁcation.

Table 1: Experience, Cohort, Time Decomposition for U.S. and China
Experience Effect (0-39)

Cohort Effect (1935-1984)

Time Effect (1986-2012)

U.S.

China

U.S.

China

U.S.

China

1. Baseline

3.70

2.53

1.19

1.87

0.70

3.38

2. State/province FE

3.71

2.53

1.19

1.78

0.71

2.96

/

2.37

/

1.79

/

3.27

3.24

2.55

1.20

1.84

0.85

3.56

3. Four provinces
4. Experience = Age − 20
5. Years since ﬁrst job

18

/

2.31

/

1.71

/

3.92

6. Alternative ﬂat region

4.10

3.18

1.36

2.52

0.65

2.82

7. Depreciation rate

2.87

2.22

0.86

1.57

0.86

3.76

8. 35 years of experience

3.46

2.10

1.03

1.38

0.76

4.15

9. Median regression

3.91

2.11

1.21

1.42

0.60

3.65

10. Controlling education

3.39

2.35

1.04

1.47

0.84

3.64

11. Hourly wage

1.84

/

1.03

/

0.80

/

Notes: This table reports various robustness results of the experience, cohort, time decomposition for the U.S. and China. The ﬁrst row is the
baseline result as discussed in the main text. Row 2 controls for state ﬁxed effect for the U.S. and provincial ﬁxed effect for China, and Row 3 only
focuses on the four provinces covered in all years including 2010-2012. Row 4 considers an alternative deﬁnition of potential experience as age
minus 20, and Row 5 as years since the ﬁrst job, which is only available in UHS but not in CPS. Row 6-8 considers alternative input restrictions of
the HLT method. Row 6 assumes no experience in the last 5 years, Row 7 assumes a human capital depreciation rate of 1% per year in the last 5
years, and Row 8 drops the sample with more than 35 years of experience and assumes a ﬂat region in the last 5 years. Row 9 performs a quantile
regression at the median. Row 10 controls for years of schooling. Row 11 considers hourly wage for full-time workers in the U.S.

Fifth, our goal here is not to identify the “causal effect” on earnings but rather to perform an
accounting exercise. As a ﬁrst step, we do not control for education. But we do separately consider college and high school groups in Section 5.2, which essentially allows college workers and
high school workers to have heterogeneous types of skills. We provide in Row 10 as a robustness
check the speciﬁcation with years of schooling controlled. As expected, the cohort effect of China
has decreased in this speciﬁcation, since an important part of inter-cohort productivity growth
is coming from the increasing overall level of education. But there is still a large increase in the
cohort effect even after education is controlled. This suggests after teasing out the compositional
changes of education (between-group effects), there is still inter-cohort productivity growth conditional on education (within-group effects). We will revisit the discussion of different education
groups in Section 5.2.
Finally, since we do not have information on hours worked in UHS, we restrict attention
mostly to earnings for the U.S. as well, for a fair comparison. Nevertheless, we report in Row 11
the decomposition result using hourly wage for full-time male workers in CPS. The experience
effects are much smaller than previous speciﬁcations using earnings, because workers increase
hours a lot during the ﬁrst few years since labor market entry (see Figure A.3 for direct evidence).
That said, the estimated cohort effect and time effect are still in the ballpark consistent with other
speciﬁcations.

4.1

Experience Effect: Life-Cycle Human Capital Accumulation
Consistent with the ﬁnding in Lagakos et al. (2018) and Islam et al. (2018) that developed

countries have higher returns to experience than developing countries, we ﬁnd that the U.S.
exhibits higher experience effects than China, as shown in the left panel of Figure 4. For an
average American male worker, the human capital supplied at the end of his working life will be
nearly 4-folds of his initial human capital supplied upon entry into the labor market. In China,
the accumulated return to experience for the most experienced male workers is about 2.5 times
the most inexperienced ones.23
In the classical life-cycle human capital accumulation literature, pioneered by Ben-Porath
(1967) and Mincer (1974), life-cycle earnings are interpreted as the amount of human capital
supplied to the employers. In those models, earnings are increasing over the life cycle because (1)
workers accumulate human capital to enhance their human capital capacity, and (2) workers will
invest less and hence contribute a larger fraction of their capacity to work when it approaches
the end of their career.24 An implicit assumption, when wage changes over the life cycle are
23 The

magnitudes are not directly comparable to the result for US reported by LMPQS, however. The outcome
variable they are concerning is hourly wage, constructed as labor earnings divided by the number of hours worked,
while we are looking at annual earnings. As shown in Figure A.3, there is a large hours increase (or part-time to
full-time transition) for very young workers in the U.S. We provide an additional decomposition using hourly wage
in Figure A.4 and Row 11 of Table 1. The result is consistent with the experience effects reported by LMPQS, which
reassures the validity of our decomposition.
24 In Ben-Porath (1967)’s framework, time devoted to working and investing are distinct concepts in the model, but
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interpreted as changes in the quantity of human capital supplied, is that the price of human
capital is constant in different periods over the life cycle. Formally, only when assuming Pt ≡
P, ∀t, we have

Pt · Hc,t1
Hc,t1
Wc,t1
= 1
=
.
Wc,t2
Pt2 · Hc,t2
Hc,t2

The considerable time effects estimated from our decomposition suggest that Pt ≡ P, ∀t is not an
innocuous assumption for the case of fast-growing economies like China, although it is a rather
good approximation for the U.S.
Although we take a simple abstraction to model wages as being determined in a competitive
labor market with perfect information, and hence interpret experience effects are life cycle human capital accumulation, it is worth pointing out that there are other models consistent with
the estimated experience effects. For instance, one could introduce search frictions and allow
for on-the-job search (e.g., Burdett and Mortensen, 1998), where the experience effects reﬂect
workers climbing up the job ladder thanks to the arrival of new job offers. Alternatively, one
could introduce information frictions in a job matching model (e.g., Jovanovic, 1979), where the
experience effects reﬂect workers’ Bayesian learning about the match quality.
How can we explain the steeper returns to experience in the U.S. than in China (or more generally, in developed countries than in developing countries)? LMPQS concludes that evidence
does not support long-term contracts as an important driver, but they do ﬁnd human capital and
search frictions are consistent with the moments reported in their paper. Yet another new, potential explanation for why the experience effect is higher in the U.S. than in China is that workers’
skills are multidimensional, and the speed of accumulation may differ for different dimensions
of skills (see Lise and Postel-Vinay, 2020, for example). If the more developed economies value
cognitive skills more as supposed to manual skills than the less developed economies, and if
cognitive skills have faster accumulation than manual skills, then the measured experience effect
would be higher in developed economies. The investigation of this hypothesis is beyond the
scope of the current paper, and we leave this direction for future research when there is suitable
data to study the heterogeneous distributions of multidimensional skills and skill requirements
across countries.

4.2

Cohort Effect: Inter-Cohort Productivity Growth
Cohort effects capture the inter-cohort growth of initial human capital upon entry into the

labor market. Since the life-cycle human capital accumulation is imposed to be the same across
cohorts in the baseline analysis, the same numbers also capture the inter-cohort growth of human
capital at any given age as well as the life-time human capital. The middle panel of Figure 4
a usual dataset cannot distinguish them. One has to take a stand on how much of the measured hours worked reﬂects
time spent on working and investing. For example, Huggett et al. (2011) assume that the measured hours worked is
only work time and does not include training time. One merit of focusing on annual earnings here is to avoid such
measurement challenge of time allocation between working and training.
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shows that China has experienced rapid human capital growth among cohorts born after 1960.
While U.S. workers’ human capital increase by only about 20% in half a century of cohorts, the
most recent cohort in China more than doubled the human capital of their counterparts 50 years
ago. The cohort effects may come from several sources. For example, later cohorts receive more
and/or higher-quality education, stay in better health conditions, or are equipped with more
pertinent skills to perform the most recent vintages of technologies.
Despite the rapidness of inter-cohort growth in China, the growth is unevenly shared among
different cohorts. Most of the growth is reaped by workers born after 1960, while a whole
generation prior to that witnessed very little human capital growth.

4.3

Time Effect: Human Capital Rental Price Changes
We interpret the year effects in the right panel of Figure 4 as changes in the rental price to

human capital. Human capital price in 2012 has increased to about 3.5 folds its level in 1986 in
China, while there is little change in human capital prices in the U.S. If anything, the human
capital price in the U.S. decreases at a pace of around a 1% decline per year from 1986 to 2012.

5 Applications
We now use our decomposition results to revisit several classical and important questions
in macroeconomics and labor economics. First, we revisit the growth accounting exercise by
adjusting for human capital changes based on our estimates. Second, we revisit skill-biased
technical changes by accounting for potentially differential human capital changes of different
skill groups. Lastly, we simulate a counterfactual economy that starts to slow down after a
fast-growing period.

5.1

Growth Accounting and the Estimation of the TFP Growth
The ﬁrst application of our decomposition is to ﬁne tune a growth accounting. Consider a

standard Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function
Yt = At Ktαt Ht1−αt ,

(7)

where Yt is the aggregate output, Kt the aggregate physical capital, Ht the aggregate human
capital, At the total factor productivity (TFP), and αt the factor share distribution parameter. Note
that all elements are allowed to depend on time t. Denote lower case letters the corresponding
variables in per worker terms, i.e., x := X/L, where X ∈ {Y, K, H } and L is the total number of
workers. The output per worker can be expressed as yt = At kαt t h1t −αt .
First, we could directly measure yt , k t , and αt in the data — this is the standard part. Specifically, we obtain four annual data series for each country: (1) real GDP Yt , (2) capital stock Kt ,
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(3) number of persons engaged Lt , and (4) share of labor compensation in GDP, all of which are
from the Penn World Table 9.0 (Feenstra et al., 2015) provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis website.25 We divide the real GDP Yt and capital stock Kt by the number of workers
Lt , to construct output per worker yt and capital stock per worker k t for each year t. Under the
competitive framework, the labor share is equal to 1 − αt , which we set to the observed share of
labor compensation in GDP.
Second, we construct human capital changes based on estimates from the decomposition in
Section 4 — this is the new part. Speciﬁcally, we construct the average human capital at time t
(up to a normalization) as the weighted average of the human capital of each cohort group and
experience group
ht =

∑ ∑ exp(sc + rk )ω (c, k; t),
c

k

where ω (c, k; t) gives the employment share of workers of cohort c and experience k at time t,
and estimates for cohort-speciﬁc human capital sc and returns to experience rk are obtained from
our decomposition in Section 4. We could therefore get an estimated series for changes in human
capital per worker.26
Taking stock, TFP changes could be measured as a residual from
d ln yt = d ln Ãt + αt d ln k t + (1 − αt ) d ln ht ,

(8)

where d ln Ãt := d ln At + (ln k t − ln ht ) dαt . However, since our decomposition can only deliver changes but not levels, we cannot obtain the levels of ht and are not able to distinguish

(ln k t − ln ht ) dαt from d ln At .27 In practice, as long as the annual labor share change dαt is small
(it indeed is), this serves as a reasonable approximation to TFP changes.28 Such approximation
is commonly adopted in growth accounting (e.g., Fernald, 2014).
We present the contribution of each source — physical capital per worker, human capital per
worker, and the residual — to the growth of GDP per worker in Figure 5. We ﬁnd that all three
sources contribute almost equally to the U.S. growth, with the contribution of human capital
slightly exceeding the other two sources. The picture is quite different in China. Although the
absolute level of the growth in human capital is larger in China than in the U.S., the relative
contribution of human capital turns out be the least important to China’s growth. But this is
merely a result of an even faster speed at which the physical capital and TFP grow in China. In
fact, physical capital is responsible for almost 60% of the growth in GDP per worker, and TFP for
25 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/categories/33402. The series on the share of labor compensation in GDP for China
starts from 1992. We therefore are forced to impute the labor share between 1986 and 1991 to the same level of 1992.
26 For our estimated series from male earnings data to apply to the national growth accounting, one needs to assume
that the human capital changes (not necessarily levels) are the same for males and females.
27 Our method only delivers growth accounting and cannot perform levels accounting. This is because our decomposition delivers three series of changes relative to some base group, not the levels.
28 Elsby et al. (2013) show that observed changes in the labor share barely affect the results of a growth accounting
exercise.
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Figure 5: Growth Accounting
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Notes: This ﬁgures decomposes the growth in GDP per worker (black diamond) into contributions of
physical capital per worker (red triangle), human capital per worker (blue circle), and TFP residual (green
cross). Note that the scales differ in the two ﬁgures.

almost another 30% in China.
Our ﬁndings should be viewed as a reﬁnement of the existing growth accounting results in
the literature by providing a more “under-the-hood” examination of what is often called the
“black-box” TFP growth. This is achieved through the incorporation in our growth accounting
procedure of the inter-cohort human capital improvements and the life-cycle human capital accumulation. Although one should not expect the levels of our TFP estimates to be identical to
other estimates because it is well-known that TFP is a model-based concept, it would give us
additional reassurance in the accuracy of the method if our TFP estimates were able to track the
broad movements over time in other prominent TFP estimates. Now we put the results to such a
test. The growth accounting results in Figure 5 suggest little TFP growth in the U.S. since mid2000s, which is consistent with the productivity slowdown during the same period according to
estimates by Fernald (2015). For China, Figure 5 shows that TFP increases by close to 60% from
1986 to 2012, almost all of which are reaped since 2000. This is consistent with the estimates by
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Zhu (2012), who also ﬁnd that a much larger TFP growth occurred after the late 1990s.29 This
is a period when many prominent economic reforms have happened, such as the privatization
of the State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) from 1998, the trade liberalization following China’s entry
into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, and the massive internal migration.30
There are several related attempts to adjust for human capital in development and growth accounting. Hall and Jones (1999) impute human capital as h = exp {ϕ (e)}, where e denotes years
of schooling and ϕ′ (e) estimated as the return to schooling from a standard Mincerian log wage
regression. Bils and Klenow (2000) extend the idea to include Mincerian return of experience as
well. In addition, they introduce interdependence on the human capital of older cohorts to capture teachers’ inﬂuences on the next generation. Such an approach based on Mincer regressions
to measure human capital typically ﬁnds that cross-country differences in output per worker
are largely driven by differences in TFP. A potential problem of those constructions based on
educational attainment is that this approach implicitly assumes one additional year of schooling
contains the same quality of human capital across countries or over time. Manuelli and Seshadri
(2014) take a different route. Instead of relying on the Mincer regression, they specify and calibrate a model of human capital acquisition with early childhood development, schooling, and
on-the-job training, and then calculate human capital stocks from the calibrated model. They ﬁnd
a larger role for human capital and a smaller role for TFP in explaining the cross-country differences in output per worker. Our approach combines the merits of both approaches: it properly
infers human capital while maintaining the simplicity and transparency of the procedure. The
closest to our exercise is Bowlus and Robinson (2012), who use the HLT identifying restriction
to tease out human capital price changes from human capital quantity changes. They are the
ﬁrst to apply HLT in the context of growth accounting and ﬁnd that adjusting the human capital
input changes reduces the contribution of TFP to growth dramatically. Building on the insights
of Bowlus and Robinson (2012), we take one step further by separating the role of experience
accumulation and inter-cohort improvements in aggregate human capital growth, which we turn
to now.
We calculate the role of experience to aggregate human capital by ﬁxing the cohort effect at
its base group level. Similarly, we calculate the role of cohort by ﬁxing the experience effect at
its base group level.31 The left panel of Figure 6 shows that human capital per worker increases
by almost 30% in the U.S. from 1986 to 2012, most of which is due to experience effects while
little due to inter-cohort human capital improvements. This is perhaps not surprising given that
29 Zhu (2012) estimates the average annual total factor productivity growth in the nonagricultural sector to be 2.17%
and 0.27% for the nonstate and state sectors during 1988-1998, but 3.67% and 5.50% for non-state and state sectors
during 1998-2007.
30 Chen et al. (2019) carefully addresses the selection issue in the privatization of SOEs and ﬁnds that privatization
does lead to productivity gains. Brandt et al. (2017) provides evidence that trade liberalization — both input tariff
cuts and output tariff cuts — raises ﬁrms’ productivity. Tombe and Zhu (2019) quantify that the reduction in internal
trade and migration costs accounts for 28% of China’s growth.
31 The “experience” series in Figure 6 is calculated as hexperience =
∑c ∑k exp(rk )ω (c, k; t) and the “cohort” series as
t
hcohort
=
exp
(
s
)
ω
(
c,
k;
t
)
.
∑c ∑k
c
t
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Figure 6: Decomposition of Human Capital Growth into Experience and Cohort Effects
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Notes: This ﬁgures decomposes the average human capital growth (blue circle) into contributions of the
experience effect (orange triangle) and the cohort effect (gray diamond).

the estimated cohort effect is small but the experience effect is very large in the U.S. Productivity
gains from experience in an aging workforce would be large if the life-cycle human capital accumulation is fast. The right panel of Figure 6 shows that, in China, human capital per worker
increases by almost 40% during the same period. Inter-cohort human capital improvement is a
more important contributor. It accounts for two-thirds of the overall human capital growth while
experience accumulation only accounts for the remaining one-third.

5.2

College Premium and Skill-Biased Technical Changes

5.2.1 Heterogeneous Human Capital by Education Groups
In the baseline estimation, we assume that human capital is homogeneous so that every
worker’s skill can simply be represented by a single index indicating the level of efﬁciency units.
It is straightforward to extend our framework to allow for different types of human capital. For
example, college and high school graduates may possess different types of skills that are not
perfect substitutes. To do so, we perform the decomposition as discussed in Section 4 separately
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for college workers and high school workers. College and high school workers are allowed
to have different paths of life-cycle human capital growth, different inter-cohort human capital
growth, and different time series of human capital price changes. The only restriction is that for
both college workers and high school workers, there is no additional skill accumulation from
experience in the last two experience bins towards the end of working life. Since our imputation
of potential experience assumes that college graduates start to gain experience from 22 years old
and high school graduates start to gain experience from 18 years old, effectively it is assumed
that college graduates do not have additional returns to experience in 52-61 years old and high
school graduates in 48-57 years old. This is largely overlapped with the “ﬂat spot” proposed by
Bowlus and Robinson (2012). After detailed investigation of the U.S. data, they conclude that a
reasonable choice for the ﬂat spot of the experience effect is around 50-59 for college graduates
and 46-55 for high school graduates.
The results are presented in Figure 7. First, within an education group, the returns to experience are still higher in the U.S. than in China. Within a country, the experience effects are larger
for college workers than high school workers. This is consistent with ﬁndings documented by
the previous literature that life-cycle wage growth tends to be faster for workers with more education (see Bagger et al., 2014, for example). The difference between the two education groups
in their experience effect proﬁles, however, is much smaller compared to the difference in the
cohort effects that we are turning to.
Second, China and the U.S. exhibit very different patterns of cross-education comparisons
in cohort effects. For the U.S., we ﬁnd that the inter-cohort productivity growth is large and
positive for college graduates, while it is even negative for high school graduates. This ﬁnding
echoes the fanning-out phenomenon in wage inequality documented by Acemoglu and Autor
(2011). In China, both education groups exhibit cohort-to-cohort improvement in human capital,
but the inter-cohort growth is particularly high for college graduates. It is also interesting to note
a decline of the cohort-speciﬁc human capital that happened to 1980-1984 birth cohort college
graduates. This is perhaps not surprising if one links to the institutional background this cohort
experienced. The Chinese government massively expanded college enrollment from 1999.32 As
a much large fraction of this cohort could enroll in college than previous cohorts, thanks to the
higher education expansion, the selectivity of college decreases signiﬁcantly. Thus, the distribution of innate ability among this cohort of college students may shift downward compared
to previous cohorts of college students. It is reassuring that our decomposition picks up this
pattern.
Finally, the trends in time effects are broadly similar for both education groups. There appears
to be a diverging trend of relative prices in the two countries. In China, the rental price of human
capital increases rapidly for both education groups, and the rental price of college human capital
32 There were 1.08 million students admitted by colleges in 1998. The number doubled after only two years, with
2.21 million students admitted in 2000, and continued to increase afterwards.
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increases even faster than that of high school human capital. In the U.S., the human capital
price does not change much for either education group, but decreases slightly more for college
workers.
5.2.2 Decomposing College Premium
The wage ratio between college graduates and high school graduates is often interpreted
as the relative price between college skills and high school skills. By this logic, evolution in
the college wage premium is informative about changes in the relative skill prices. The implicit
assumption is that the relative amount of human capital between education groups is unchanged.
Suppose the average wage of each education group e ∈ {cl, hs} at time t is Wte = Pte Hte , where
Pte is the rental price to the human capital of education group e at time t, and Hte is the average
human capital for workers of education group e at time t. Note that
Ptcl
Htcl
Ptcl
Wtcl
=
×
:
=
× ξt
Wths
Pths
Hths
Pths
Only under the assumption of constant relative amount of human capital that ξ t = Htcl /Hths ≡
ξ, ∀t, can we interpret the changes in the college premium over time as reﬂecting entirely the
changes in the relative price of college human capital and high school human capital. Under
this implicit assumption, the seemingly puzzling fact that an increase in the college wage premium is coming together with a remarkable increase in the supply of college workers in the U.S.
motivates the literature on the skill-biased technical changes (see Acemoglu and Autor, 2011;
Violante, 2008, for excellent overviews). However, the so-called “skill-biased technical changes”,
which is essentially a residual object, may also reﬂect changes in the relative human capital between education groups, and thus may not necessarily be all due to technological changes. Our
decomposition allows us to estimate the changes in the relative human capital of college versus
high school workers as well as the relative price of college versus high school skills. We construct
relative human capital quantity series based on both experience and cohort effects, as we do
in Section 5.1. We then decompose the evolution of average college premium into the relative
changes in the price and quantity of human capital possessed by the two education groups.
The results are plotted in Figure 8. The college premium is constructed based on the relative
log earnings among prime age workers between 25 and 54 years old and we normalize the series
to reﬂect changes relative to its 1986 level. As is shown in the left panel, in the U.S., the relative
price between college human capital and high school human capital is actually declining. Rising
college premium in the U.S. is mainly a result of the increase in the relative quantity of college
human capital, i.e., an average college worker’s human capital increases more than an average
high school worker. In fact, the relative human capital quantity of an average college worker
increases even more than offset the declining relative skill price so that the college premium still
increases. The right panel of Figure 8 shows that in China, the increase in the college wage
27

Figure 7: Decomposition for College and High School Workers
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premium is driven by both the increase in the relative prices and the increase in relative quantity
of college human capital to non-college human capital, but the relative price changes play a more
important role. Note that in both ﬁgures, the residual term is tightly around zero, suggesting
that the decomposition provides a good ﬁt to the data.
5.2.3 Skill-Biased Technical Change
The ﬁnding in the previous subsection that most of the rise in the relative wage of college
workers versus non-college workers in the U.S. is accounted for by the relative human capital
quantity, rather than the relative skill price, is consistent with Bowlus and Robinson (2012). At
ﬁrst glance, this may seem to be a contradiction to skill-biased technical changes. Below, we
take a step further to infer the extent of skill-biased technical changes in both countries. We ﬁnd
no contradiction between declining relative skill prices in the U.S. and the skill-biased technical
changes. In fact, our decomposition results reveal large skill-biased technical changes in both
countries, without which the relative price of college human capital in the U.S. would decline
even more as the relative quantity of college human capital rose rapidly.
We revisit the magnitude of skill-biased technical change by taking into account the potential
changes in the relative quantity of college versus high school human capital. Consider an aggregate production function that exhibits constant elasticity of substitution over college and high
school human capital:

h
i σ
σ −1
σ −1 σ −1
Yt = ( Ast Hts ) σ + ( Aut Htu ) σ
,

(9)

where H s and H u are the aggregate human capital quantity of the two types of skills, As and Au
are the respective skill augmenting technology, and σ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between
these two types of human capital.33 Assume skills are paid by their marginal product. With a
slight abuse of notation that time subscripts are dropped, the relative price of the two types of
skills can be written as:
 s
 s
 s
 s
p
σ−1
A
1
h
1
L
=
− ln
− ln
,
ln
ln
u
u
u
p
σ
A
σ
h
σ
Lu

(10)

where hs and hu are the efﬁciency units (human capital quantity) per worker of the two education
groups, and Ls and Lu are the total number of workers of the two education groups, such that
the aggregate supply is H s = hs Ls and H u = hu Lu . The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side captures
the contribution of the skill-biased technical changes to the relative price changes. The second
term reﬂects the role of changes in the relative quantity of human capital per worker. The last
term is the simple labor supply effect.
We calibrate σ = 1.4, which is the benchmark value estimated by Katz and Murphy (1992) us33 Since

the focus here is on workers of different education, we abstract from capital in the production function. It
is without loss of generality though, as the role of capital can be captured by As and Au . For example, Krusell et al.
(2000) endogenize the source of skill-biased technical change through the role of capital-skill complementarity.
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Figure 8: Decomposing Changes in College Premium
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Notes: This ﬁgure decomposes changes in college premium (black diamond) into changes in relative
human capital price (red triangle) and changes in relative human capital quantity (blue circle). The dashed
gray line plots the residual of the decomposition.

ing 40 years of U.S. data, and obtain an estimated series for contributions of changes in As /Au .34
Since σ > 1, an increase in As /Au (i.e., skill-biased technical change) will increase ps /pu , while
an increase in either hs /hu or Ls /Lu (i.e., an increasing relative supply of skilled human capital) will decrease ps /pu . Our decomposition delivers changes in the relative price ps /pu and
the relative human capital quantities per worker hs /hu . Since the relative labor supply Ls /Lu is
observed, the contributions of skill-biased technical changes can thus be obtained as a residual.
We discuss the relation to previous estimates of skill-biased technical changes in Appendix C.3.
The contributions of relative labor supply, relative human capital per worker, and skill-biased
technical change to the evolution of relative human capital prices are depicted in Figure 9. It
shows clearly that in both U.S. and China, the relative quantity of college human capital grows
rapidly, which would have led to sharp declines in the price of college human capital relative
to non-college human capital. Due to skill-biased technical changes, the relative price of college
34 Acemoglu and Autor (2011) conclude that most estimates in the literature agreed on a value of σ to be somewhere
between 1.4 and 2. We report the decomposition results under σ = 2 in Figure A.5. Although the exact numbers
change a bit, the overall pattern is robust.
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Figure 9: Decomposing Changes in Relative Human Capital Prices
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Notes: This ﬁgure decomposes changes in relative human capital prices (red triangle) into relative labor
supply (green cross), relative human capital quantity per worker (blue circle), and skill-biased technical
change (orange diamond), under σ = 1.4 estimated by Katz and Murphy (1992).

human capital did not decline even more in the U.S. and actually increased in China in the last
thirty years.

5.3

“New Normal” and the Golden Ages in China
The fast growth in China is expected to slow down in the future. Between 1986 and 2012, the

average inter-cohort human capital growth rate in China is 1.40% (= 1.871/45 − 1) per year, and
the average growth rate of human capital prices in China is 4.80% (= 3.381/26 − 1) per year. Both
are astonishing rates of growth, while the two growth rates are both close to 0 for US. However,
the spectacular growth in China in the last forty years is not expected to last forever; in fact,
since 2010, the growth rate in China has slowed down signiﬁcantly, and many analysts expect
the “new normal” growth rate in China to converging to rates similar to those in the U.S. (Barro,
2016). In this section, we perform a simple experiment that both the cohort effects and time
effects still grow but start to uniformly decelerate in thirty years to a stationary environment of
zero growth in cohort and time effect (approximately the U.S. case), with the experience effects
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the hypothetical scenario for age-earnings proﬁles if China’ cohorts effects and
time effects start to uniformly decelerate to a stationary environment in thirty years.

ﬁxed at China’s current estimated level.
In Figure 10, we show that under this scenario, the vertical gaps between two consecutive
cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles will be shrinking, showing the slowdown in the time effects.
Notably, the “golden age,” which was around 30-35 in 2010, would become older and to 45-50
years old in 2035. Recall Proposition 1 and its corollary that the position of the “golden age” is
essentially a race between experience effects and cohort effects. The “golden age” becoming older
is a result of the slowdown in the cohort effects (i.e., the inter-cohort human capital growth rate).
If the Chinese economy indeed slows down and converges to the “new normal” growth rates
similar to more mature developed economy such as the U.S. in the next thirty years, our simulation suggests that the cross-sectional age-earning proﬁles over time will exhibit older “golden
ages”, and reverse the pattern of ever-lowering “golden ages” in the the next thirty years.
Is this a realistic prediction? Only history will tell for sure, but interestingly, Figure 11 shows
that such a pattern of increasing “golden ages” actually happened in Korea during the past ten
years, using data from the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS). Korea experienced
its fastest growth during the 1960s to 1990s. After that, it began to slowdown. Appendix Figure
A.6 depicts the decomposition for Korea, together with the decomposition for U.S. and China.
It is worth noting that the cohort effects are particularly large from cohort 1945 to cohort 1960,
but starts to decelerate afterwards. This is consistent with our explanation of the race between
inter-cohort productivity growth and returns to experience. As inter-cohort productivity growth
starts to give its way to experience in Korea, the “golden age” comes back to older ages, as in
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Figure 11: Cross-Sectional Age-Earnings Proﬁles of Korean Male Workers
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles of Korean male workers, using KLIPS
data from 1997 to 2015. Each curve represents a cross section that pools adjacent years. The solid lines are
kernel smoothed values and the gray shaded areas are the 95% conﬁdence intervals.

our hypothetical scenario in Figure 10.

6 Conclusion
In this paper, we ﬁrst document stark differences in the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles
between the U.S. and China, the two largest economies in the world, during the past thirty years.
We ﬁnd that, ﬁrst, the peak age in cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles, which we refer to as
the “golden age,” stayed almost constant at around 45-50 years old in the U.S., but decreased
sharply from 55 to around 35 years old in China; second, the age-speciﬁc real earnings grew
drastically in China, but stayed almost stagnant in the U.S.; and third, the cross-sectional and
life-cycle age-earnings proﬁles looked remarkably similar in the U.S., but differed substantially
in China.
To explain these striking differences, we propose and empirically implement a uniﬁed decomposition framework to infer from the repeated cross-sectional earnings data the life-cycle
human capital accumulation (the experience effect), the inter-cohort productivity growth (the cohort effect), and the human capital price changes over time (the time effect), under an identifying
assumption that the growth of the experience effect stops at the end of one’s working career.
The decomposition suggests that China has experienced a much larger inter-cohort productivity
growth and higher increase in the rental price to human capital compared to the U.S.; but the
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return to experience is higher in the U.S.
We also use the inferred components, particularly the series of the quantities of human capital,
to revisit several important and classical applications in macroeconomics and labor economics,
including the growth accounting and the estimation of the TFP growth, and the college wage
premium and the skill-biased technical change. We ﬁnd that once we adjust for the changes in
the quantities of human capital, the estimated contribution of the TFP to GDP per capita growth
is smaller than the previous estimates in the literature. We also ﬁnd that the skill-biased technical
change played an important role in the rising college premium to ensure that the relative price
of college human capital does not drop as much as it would otherwise do when there is a
large increase in the quantity of college human capital. A simple simulation exercise using our
framework also suggests that, as the Chinese economy slows down to a “new normal” growth
rate similar to that in the U.S., the golden ages of the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁle in China
will start to increase to older ages, similar to what has happened in Korea in the last ten years.
The mostly descriptive ﬁndings in this paper suggest many potential directions for future
research. First, in our analysis, we assume that workers are either perfect substitutes, or perfect
substitutes within an education group. This rules out the possibility that there might be new
vintages of physical capital that can only be combined with the human capital of newer cohorts;
that is, the human capital of different cohorts are not substitutable. To distinguish technological
changes that favor younger generations from the inter-cohort human capital growth would require better-suited data or richer model structures, but it is an exciting area for future research.
Second, it is also important to link the decomposition results to speciﬁc institutions and reforms,
and evaluate how much each policy contribute to the evolution of these components. For example, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the re-opening of the schools at the end of the Cultural
Revolution and the 1999 college expansion in China are the most related to the inter-cohort
productivity growth documented for China; the accession to WTO and SOE reforms may well
increase the overall efﬁciency of the economy and hence also the rental price to human capital.
Third, throughout the paper we focused on urban males. A natural question is how structural
change from agriculture to industry, increasing female labor participation, and internal migration
(especially in China) are reﬂected in the decomposition. Fourth, understanding why the returns
to experience are higher in developed economies than in less developed economies, which was
documented in Lagakos et al. (2018) and conﬁrmed in our study, is an interesting area for further
explorations. Fifth, it is also important to examine the implications of the rapid inter-cohort productivity growth and human capital rental price in China on other programs such as the social
security system.35
Finally, in this paper we focused on U.S. and China because they are the two largest economies
in the world, and the labor market dynamics in these two countries are likely to play an out-sized
35 For example, see Fang and Zhang (2021) for an exploratory study on the relationship between inter-cohort productivity growth and pension reform, particularly the delay of retirement age, in China.

34

inﬂuence on the global economy, but the decomposition framework in this paper can be fruitfully
applied in other countries.
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Additional Figures

Figure A.1: Cross-Sectional Age-Earnings Proﬁles of U.S. Male Workers in Metropolitan Areas
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles of U.S. male workers that live in metropolitan areas, using March CPS from 1986 to 2012. Each curve represents a cross section that pools adjacent
years. The solid lines are kernel smoothed values and the gray shaded areas are the 95% conﬁdence
intervals.
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Figure A.2: Cross-Sectional Age-Earnings Proﬁles of Chinese Urban Male Workers in 15
Provinces Covering 1986-2009
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the cross-sectional age-earnings proﬁles of Chinese Urban male workers in Beijing,
Shanxi, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Guangdong,
Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, covering 1986-2000 in the left panel and 2001-2009 in the right panel. Each curve
represents a cross section that pools adjacent years. The solid lines are kernel smoothed values and the
gray shaded areas are the 95% conﬁdence intervals. Note that the vertical scale of the left and right panels
differ. Also note that the time coverage is shorter than the baseline result—we only have data till 2009,
instead of 2012, for these 15 provinces.
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Figure A.3: Cross-Sectional Age-Hours Proﬁles
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Notes: This ﬁgure plots the cross-sectional age-hours proﬁles of U.S. and Chinese male workers in 20022006. Hours worked per week is measured by the “total number of hours usually worked per week over
all jobs the year prior to the survey” from CPS (for U.S.) and imputed as “total number of hours worked
last month” divided by 4.3 from UHS (for China).
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Figure A.4: Decomposition Using Hourly Wage for U.S. Full-Time Workers
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Notes: This ﬁgure shows the decomposition results of experience, cohort, and time effects in the U.S. based on hourly wage for
full-time workers.

Figure A.5: Decomposing Changes in Relative Human Capital Prices (σ = 2)
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Notes: This ﬁgure decomposes changes in relative human capital prices (red triangle) into relative labor
supply (green cross), relative human capital quantity per worker (blue circle), and skill-biased technical
change (orange diamond), under σ = 2, the upper bound for σ estimated in the literature, according to
Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
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Figure A.6: Decomposition
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and Korea (green triangle), under the baseline speciﬁcation.
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Additional Tables

Table B.1: Sample Provinces in Our UHS Random Subsample
Provinces

Code

1986-2001

2002-2009

Beijing

11

X

X

Shanxi

14

X

X

Liaoning

21

X

X

Heilongjiang

23

X

X

Shanghai

31

X

X

Jiangsu

32

X

X

Zhejiang

33

X

Anhui

34

X

X

Jiangxi

36

X

X

Shandong

37

X

X

Henan

41

X

X

Hubei

42

X

X

Guangdong

44

X

X

Chongqing

50

Sichuan

51

X

X

Yunnan

53

X

X

Shaanxi

61

X

Gansu

62

X

X

17

16

Total

2010-2012

X

X

X

X
X

4

Notes: This table reports the regional coverage of our UHS random subsample.
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C

Additional Discussion

C.1

Age-Cohort-Time Identiﬁcation

McKenzie (2006). Consider the following statistical model of age/experience, cohort, and time.
Suppose the variable of interest is a linearly additive model of cohort (c), experience (k) and time
(t) effects with
yc,t = αc + β k + γt + ε c,t ,
where k := t − c. Hall (1968) and McKenzie (2006) show that second differences (and higher order
differences) of these effects can be identiﬁed without any assumption, while ﬁrst differences of
these effects can be identiﬁed with one restriction. To see this, consider cohort c1 at time periods
t1 and t2 = t1 + 1 and take a ﬁrst difference:
∆t yc1 ,t2 ≡ (yc1 ,t2 − yc1 ,t1 ) = ( β k2 − β k1 ) + (γt2 − γt1 ) + ∆t ε c1 ,t2 ,
where k1 = t1 − c1 and k2 = t2 − c1 = k1 + 1. Similarly, consider cohort c0 = c1 − 1 at the same
time periods t1 and t2 :
∆t yc0 ,t2 ≡ (yc0 ,t2 − yc0 ,t1 ) = ( β k3 − β k2 ) + (γt2 − γt1 ) + ∆t ε c0 ,t2 ,
where k3 = t2 − c0 . Taking a second difference of the above two ﬁrst differences we have
∆c ∆t yc0 ,t2 ≡ (∆t yc0 ,t2 − ∆t yc1 ,t2 ) = ( β k3 − β k2 ) − ( β k2 − β k1 ) + ∆c ∆t ε c0 ,t2 .
Thus the change in the slope of the experience proﬁle (i.e., a second difference) is identiﬁed.
Second differences of time and cohort effects are also identiﬁed in the same fashion.
Furthermore, by normalizing one ﬁrst difference, one can recover all remaining slopes. To
illustrate this point, say, we normalize one ﬁrst difference of experience effects. Then, we can
obtain all other ﬁrst differences of experience effects from the identiﬁed second differences. With
ﬁrst differences of experience effects at hand, we can identify ﬁrst differences of time effects,
using the fact that the time differences of the outcome variable for a given cohort are the sum
of ﬁrst differences of experience effects and ﬁrst differences of time effects. Similarly, we can
identify ﬁrst differences of cohorts, too. Hence one normalization on a ﬁrst difference sufﬁces for
identiﬁcation of all ﬁrst differences.
In addition, by further normalizing one level each of two effects, one can recover all levels.
But in this paper, what we care about are the slopes, i.e., the relative effects up to a benchmark
group, not the levels. Hence we load the level of the benchmark group to a constant term, and
aim at identifying ﬁrst differences (i.e., slopes).
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Deaton (1997). As argued in the previous section, one normalization sufﬁces for identiﬁcation
of ﬁrst differences. Many papers proceed in this way and adopt one normalization. The consumption literature, though studies a different topic, offers one popular approach to deal with
the collinearity issue. Deaton and Paxson (1994) and later Deaton (1997), in the section “Decompositions by age, cohort, and year” (page 123) of his book “The Analysis of Household Surveys,”
view year dummies as a device to capture cyclical ﬂuctuations, with the restriction that time
effects are orthogonal to a linear time trend. Aguiar and Hurst (2013) is a recent example that
follows the same practice to study life cycle expenditures.
Suppose again
yi,c,t = cons + αc + β k + γt + ε i,c,t .
where the level of the base group is load on to the constant term. In matrix form, we have
y = C + Aα + Bβ + Γγ + ε,
where each row is an observation, A, B, Γ are matrices of cohort dummies, experience dummies,
and time dummies, respectively, and α, β, γ are vectors of cohort effects, experience effects, and
time effects, respectively. Note the collinearity across time, cohort, and age t = c + k:
Γst = Asc + Bsk ,
where the s vectors are arithmetic sequences {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . } of the length given by the number
of columns of the matrix that premultiplies them. Consider another set of parameter vectors
deﬁned by
α̃ = α + κsc ,

β̃ = β + κsk ,

γ̃ = γ − κst ,

which still satisﬁes the equation of interest. Thus an arbitrary time-trend can be added to the age
dummies and cohort dummies by subtracting it from the year dummies, which sheds light on
the non-identiﬁcation problem. Deaton assumes that the year effects capture cyclical ﬂuctuations.
Formally, in addition to ∑t γt = 0 (which is an innocuous normalization as it only adjusts the
constant term), he restricts that s′ γ = 0 to capture that time effects are orthogonal to a linear
trend. Notice that the label of years is without loss of generality, for any chronological relabel of
years will still satisfy this relation.
To implement Deaton’s idea, one can regress y on a set of dummies for each cohort excluding
(say) the ﬁrst, a set of dummies for each age excluding (say) the ﬁrst, and a set of T − 2 year
dummies deﬁned as follows for t = 3, ..., T,
d∗t = dt − [(t − 1)d2 − (t − 2)d1 ] .
The coefﬁcients of d∗t ’s give the third through ﬁnal year coefﬁcients. Then one can recover the
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ﬁrst and second coefﬁcients γ1 , γ2 by solving the system of equations ∑t γt = 0 and s′ γ = 0.
This approach assumes that secular trends appear only in cohort effects and time effects
simply reﬂect ﬂuctuations. Alternatively, one could also take an opposite restriction that cohort
dummies are orthogonal to the time trend. LMPQS investigate both, or a mixture of the two to
examine the sensitivity of their results to the identifying assumption.
Another related but different approach is even simpler — instead of imposing a normalization, it directly uses observable measures as proxies for time effects. For instance, in Gourinchas
and Parker (2002) studying age-consumption proﬁles and Kambourov and Manovskii (2009)
studying age-earnings proﬁles, they use unemployment rates to capture the time effects arising
from booms and recessions.
Schulhofer-Wohl (2018). Schulhofer-Wohl (2018) proposes an alternative method that does not
require the somewhat arbitrary normalization, but virtually shifts focus from directly estimating
the age effects to estimating the parameters in age effects implied by a structural model. That is,
now the aim is to estimate θ in the following equation
yc,t = cons + αc + β (k, θ ) + γt + ε c,t ,
where β (k, θ ) is derived from an economic model and θ is a vector of model fundamentals.
To achieve identiﬁcation, this approach requires the function β (k, θ ) to be sufﬁciently nonlinear
in k. Under this condition, θ can be estimated consistently via a minimum distance procedure.
Essentially, the structural parameters are identiﬁed from second or higher order derivatives of the
age effects. This approach ultimately facilitates identiﬁcation of structural parameters associated
with age effects without ﬁrst identifying the age effects, by imposing parametric forms in the
economic model.
Heckman et al. (1998). Heckman et al. (1998) deal with the non-identiﬁcation issue using economic theory. The HLT identifying assumption is that there is no human capital accumulation
at the end of working life. This assumption could be justiﬁed in a Ben-Porath (1967) framework,
where zero on-the-job investment in that stage is the optimal choice. HLT’s approach is, in some
sense, a combination of the previous two approaches. On one hand, the identifying assumption
is essentially a normalization on the ﬁrst difference of experience effects. On the other hand,
this restriction is coming from economic theory and can be derived from a structural model of
human capital investment.

C.2

Algorithm

LMPQS adopt the HLT method as their preferred estimates for returns to experience and
set the ﬂat spot phase as from 25 years of experience to 35 years of experience. We generally

A10

follow LMPQS, which in turn combines the identiﬁcation assumption proposed by HLT with the
procedure laid out by Deaton (1997). In the baseline speciﬁcation, we impute potential experience
as min{age − edu − 6, age − 18} and consider a maximum of 40 years of experience. We group
cohorts and experience into ﬁve-year bins. Assume there is no additional experience effect in the
last two experience bins. The goal is to estimate
wi,t = constant + sc + rk + pt + ε i,t
subject to the identifying restriction r25∼29 = r35∼39 .
Transform the above equation to
wi,t = constant + sc + rk + gt + p̃t + ε i,t ,
where p̃t reﬂects ﬂuctuations orthogonal to a linear trend such that ∑t p̃t = 0 and ∑t t p̃t = 0. That
is, we rewrite an arbitrary time series pt as a linear trend gt plus ﬂuctuations p̃t . The beneﬁt of
such algebraic manipulation is that once a value of g is obtained, we can run Deaton’s procedure
as explained in Section C.1 on the deﬂated wage w̃i,t := wi,t − gt and get estimates for cohort,
experience, time effects under this particular g. Then the problem boils down to pin down the
value of g. The time trend is pinned down by the HLT assumption: we update the guess of
g until the associated experience effects are the same for the two experience groups late in life
presumed by the HLT assumption.
The algorithm can be summarized by an iterative procedure. Here we present the algorithm
for the baseline speciﬁcation. For other speciﬁcations in the robustness exercises, the algorithm
is modiﬁed accordingly.
1. Start with a guess for the growth rate g0 of the linear time trend. In practice, the guess is
picked as the coefﬁcient on the linear time trend term by regressing log wage on the set of
dummies for experience groups and a linear time trend.
2. Suppose we are now at the m-th iteration. Deﬂate the wage data using the current guess of
growth rate, gm :
w̃i,t := wi,t − gm t.
3. Rewrite the problem as a Deaton (1997) problem:
w̃i,t = constant + sc + rk + p̃t + ε i,t .
Follow Deaton’s procedure laid out in Section C.1 but use log deﬂated wage as the dependent variable. Regress log deﬂated wage on a set of dummies for experience groups, cohort
groups and d∗ ’s as deﬁned in the previous subsection C.1.
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4. Check if the estimated experience effects are sufﬁciently close between experience group 25
(or experience group 30) and experience group 35, according to a preset precision.
5. If the convergence condition is satisﬁed, then we are done. Otherwise, we update the guess
m in the speciﬁed ﬂat region in the
for the growth rate by annualized experience effect rend

current iteration with a damping factor δ:
m
gm+1 = gm + δrend
,

and go back to step 2 with the updated guess gm+1 .

C.3

Skill-Biased Technical Change

Note that human capital price per efﬁciency unit under the production function (9) is
ps =

h
i σ
1
σ −1 σ −1 − 1
σ −1
∂Y
u u σ−
σ + ( As H s ) σ
=
A
H
(
)
( A s H s ) σ −1 A s ,
s
∂H

pu =

h
i σ
1
σ −1 σ −1 − 1
σ −1
∂Y
u u σ−
σ + ( As H s ) σ
=
A
H
(
)
( A u H u ) σ −1 A u ,
u
∂H

with the time index t dropped for notational convenience but all variables except σ are allowed
to change over time. Taking logs to the ratio of ps and pu gives Equation (10).
In the skill-biased technical change literature, it is often assumed that
i σ
h
σ −1 σ −1
σ −1
,
Yt = ( Bts Lst ) σ + ( Btu Lut ) σ

(C.1)

where Ls (Lu ) is the labor supply of college (high-school) workers, and the evolution in Bs /Bu is
interpreted as the skill-biased technical change. Our formulation is consistent with it, and in fact,
further decomposes it into two components. Our formulation (9) distinguishes relative improvements in human capital (i.e., hs /hu ) from the technology that changes the relative productivity
of the two types human capital (i.e., As /Au ). These two forces together form the standard interpretation of skill-biased technical change Bs /Bu . To see this, rewrite the production function (9)
as



 σ−σ 1

σ −1
σ −1 

Yt = ( Ast hst Lst ) σ + ( Aut hut Lut ) σ 
|{z}
| {z }

Bts

.

Btu

In a competitive labor market, we have
h
i σ
1
1 σ −1 − 1
σ −1
σ −1
∂Y
u u u σ−
s s s σ−
σ
σ
= (A h L ) + (A h L )
w =
( A s h s ) σ ( L s ) σ −1 ,
s
∂L
s

wu =

h
i σ
1
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∂Y
u u u σ−
σ + ( As hs Ls ) σ
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A
h
L
(
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( A u h u ) σ ( L u ) σ −1 .
u
∂L
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ws
wu

Therefore the college premium can be written as

d ln

ws
wu



σ−1
=
d ln
σ



As
Au





=

As hs
Au hu

σ−1
+
d ln
σ



 σ−σ 1 
hs
hu



Ls
Lu

 σ−σ 1 −1

1
− d ln
σ

, or in log changes,



Ls
Lu


.

Note that with the typical formulation (C.1) such as in Katz and Murphy (1992), we will have

d ln

ws
wu



σ−1
=
d ln
σ



Bs
Bu



1
− d ln
σ



Ls
Lu


.

In other words, Bs /Bu in the standard formulation is equivalent to ( As hs ) / ( Au hu ) in our formulation, which is essentially a combination of the skill-biased technical change and the changes in
relative human capital per worker between the two skill groups.
As we can see, there are three factors that affect the college premium. An increase in relative
labor supply Ls /Lu , holding everything else ﬁxed, decreases relative wage. An increase in the
relative human capital efﬁciency units hs /hu has two effects. First, it decreases the relative human
capital prices ps /pu . Second, it increases skilled-labor’s relative earnings capacity. The overall
effect is positive if σ > 1 when the second effect dominates the ﬁrst. Similarly, the effect of the
skill-biased technical changes (increasing As /Au ) on college premium depends on σ, too. It has
a positive effect on college premium when σ > 1.
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